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THE  PLACE  OF  AGRICULTURE  IN  THE  GENERAL  ECONOMY
The  first  step  toward  understanding  the  effects  of  farm  price-
support  programs  on  economic  stability  is  to  get  some  conception
of  the  relative  importance  of  agriculture  in  the  general  economy.
Economic  Size
In  1952,  the  gross  national  product  for  the  whole  United  States
economy was estimated  at 348 billion dollars.  A comparable  measure
for  the  farm  economy  itself-the  so-called  "gross  farm  product"-
in  the  same  year  was  23.5  billion  dollars,  or  slightly  less  than  7
percent  of  total  GNP.  In  the same  year,  employment  in  agriculture
averaged  about  6.8  million  workers,  which  was  equivalent  to  11
percent  of  the employed  labor  force.  Various  other  measures  of  the
economic  size  of  agriculture  could  be  used,  but  they  would  give
results,  as  of  1952,  somewhere  between  the  two  just  mentioned.
Cross-Section  Interrelationships
In  1947,  nearly  10  percent of total cash farm  receipts was derived
from  commodities  exported  to  foreign  countries.  Another  sizable
flow,  nearly  9  percent,  was  derived  from  sales  to  other  farmers.
Sixty-three  percent  was derived  from  sales  for  food  use  by our  own
people,  and  another  18  percent  from  sales  of  nonfood  products
and  by-products  for  domestic  use,  including  cotton,  tobacco,  and
portions  of  various  other  commodities.
The  great  bulk  of cash  receipts  from  meat  animals,  dairy prod-
ucts, poultry and eggs, and fruits  and vegetables  is  derived from sales
for  food  use  by  the  domestic  population.  Exports  of  these  com-
modities  are  small.  In  contrast,  a  sizable  proportion  of  the  cash  in-
come  from  wheat,  rice,  cotton,  and  tobacco  comes  from  the  export
market.  Hence,  in  the  absence  of  price  supports,  prices  of  these
products  are subject  to impacts from all  parts of the world economy.
Farm  price-support  programs  contribute  to  economic  stability
mainly  by offsetting  or diverting  the  impacts  upon  farm  income  of
changes  in  the  demand  for  farm  products.  Changes  in  domestic
consumer  demand  for  such  products  must  be  transmitted  through
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86the  distributing,  processing,  and  transportation  industries  before
being  translated  into  impacts  upon farm  income.
Marketing  margins  are  notoriously  rigid.  Freight  rates  are
changed only at considerable  intervals.  Processing  costs include many
utilities  and  materials,  prices  of  which  are  quite  rigid.  Thus,  food
marketing  charges  are only slightly affected  by changes  in either the
retail  or  the  farm  prices  of  food  products.  If prices  and  wage  rates
in  other  parts  of  the  economy  are  rigid,  any  sudden  drop  in  retail
prices of food is transmitted almost dollar for dollar to the farm level.
Farmers buy from as  well  as sell to the  rest of  the economy.  But,
like  marketing  margins,  production  expenditures  are  relatively
inflexible.  Farm  price supports  operate  at  the  cash  receipts  or gross
income  level.  As  net  farm  income,  after  production  expenditures,
averages  less than half of gross income,  a  10 percent drop in the price
of  a  farm  product  may  mean  more  than  a  20  percent  drop  in the
net  income  from  a  given  volume  of  output.
In  concluding  this  thumb-nail  sketch  of  cross-section  inter-
relationships  between  agriculture  and  the  rest  of  the  economy,  it
may be helpful  to consider  some  characteristics  of  the  geographical
distribution  of  farm  income.  As  of  1952,  in  the  New  England  and
Middle East group  of states  agricultural  income payments  accounted
for  less  than  2  percent  of total  income  payments.  The  Southeast  is
a  major  farming  region,  but  agriculture  accounted  for  only  11.5
percent  of  its  total  income  payments.  The  percentage  was  almost
the same in the Southwest, which  includes  the important agricultural
states  of Texas and  Oklahoma.
The  Central  region,  including  most  of  the  Corn  Belt  and  the
Lake states,  is  an important and  relatively  prosperous  farming area.
However,  in  view  of  the  great  manufacturing  and  trading  centers
in  the  same  region,  agriculture  accounted  for  only  7.1  percent  of
its  total  income  payments.  The  Northwest  region,  including  the
Northern  Great Plains  and  some  of  the  Mountain  states,  shows  the
highest proportion  of agricultural  to  total income  payments  among
the  regions  listed-20.3  percent.  The  Far  West  shows  about  the
same  relation  between  agricultural  and  total  income  payments  as
does the nation as a whole-6.4 and 6.7  percent respectively  in  1952.
Except  for  the  Northwest  region,  these  figures  suggest  that  the
immediate  impact  of changes  in  farm  income  upon other  sectors  of
the  economy  would  be rather  small.  However,  in  a  few  individual
states farm income runs  as high  as 20  to  30 percent  of the  total.
A  drop  in  farm  income  in  an  area  directly  affects  the  towns-
people  in  that  area  who  sell  goods  and  services  to  farmers.  The
impact  of  reduced  purchasing  power  in  the  area  is  then  diffused
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supply  the various  goods used  in  the area.  The effects  of a  localized
drought  or  flood  upon  farm  incomes  might  cause  scarcely  a  ripple
in the big wholesaling and manufacturing centers.  A substantial drop
in  the price of  wheat,  on the  other  hand,  could  reduce  the  incomes
of farmers  in a  few  neighboring  states by 200 or 300  million dollars.
Such  a  drop  could  cause  appreciable  reduction  (as  much  as  5  per-
cent)  in  total income  payments  in  an  area  covering  several  states.
While  additional  income  effects  would  radiate  into  other  regions,
their  percentage  impacts  could  be  small.
Dynamic  Interrelationships
If  we  disregard  the  three  major  export  crops,  cotton,  wheat,
and  tobacco,  cash  farm  income  from all  other  commodities  bears  a
close  relationship  to  disposable  personal  income.  Disposable  income
is  less  closely  associated  with  cash  receipts  from  the  export  crops;
when the value of exports of these commodities is  taken into account,
the  relationship  is  considerably  improved.
During  1922-41,  a  year-to-year  change  of  10  billion  dollars  in
disposable  income  in  the  United  States  was  associated  with  an
average  change  of  more  than  a  billion dollars  in  cash  receipts  from
farm marketings.  But production  expenditures  also tended to change
with  cash  receipts.  Cash  outlays  for  production  requisites  of  non-
farm  origin  changed  about  300  million  dollars  with  year-to-year
changes  of  a  billion  dollars  in  cash  receipts.  This  association  may
be  regarded  in  large  part  as  a  "back-effect"  of  farm  income  upon
the  nonfarm  economy.
As  an  average  during  1922-41,  the  realized  net  income  of  farm
operators  declined  nearly  700  million dollars  in  response  to  a  year-
to-year decrease  of a billion dollars  in cash  receipts from  marketings.
This  also  had  its  back-effects  on the  nonfarm  economy  through  in-
creased  expenditures  on  goods  and  services  for  family  living as well
as  increased  net investment  in  farm buildings  and  equipment.
If  we  try  to  trace  the  ultimate  effects  on  the  economy  of  an
initial decrease in consumer  income,  we  become  involved  in a  series
of approximations.  The  "first  round"  decrease  in  farm  cash  receipts
leads  to  a  secondary  decrease  in  nonfarm  income  (perhaps  no more
than  10  percent  of  the  initial  one).  This leads  to  a  secondary  de-
crease  in  farm  income,  which  produces  a  third-order  effect  on  non-
farm  income  (perhaps  no  more  than  1  percent  of  the  initial
decrease).
But  there  is  another,  and  more  important,  stream  of  influences.
The  initial  contraction  in  consumer  income  means  reduced  outlays
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in nonfarm  employment  and  income,  which  reinforces  the  original
one and leads to a further  (but smaller)  contraction  in expenditures.
If,  for  example,  a  cut  in  defense  spending  and  private  investment
reduced  the rate  of income  payments  directly  by  10  billion  dollars,
the final decrease  in the  level of consumer  income might  be around
20 billions.  If so,  farm cash receipts  would tend to decrease  by  twice
the  amount  suggested  by  the  initial  impact,  rather  than  by  1.11
times  that  amount  as  suggested  by  considering  back-effects  through
farm  income  only. This is  simply the "multiplier"  mechanism,  made
familiar  by  Keynes.
Demand  and  supply  relationships  for  individual  commodities
also need to be  considered in the analysis  of farm price  supports.  For
example,  the  main  determinants  of  retail  price  for  a  perishable
commodity  are  the  supply  available  for  consumption  and  the  dis-
posable  income  of  consumers.  Marketing  margins  are  generally
established  by  competition  between  marketing  agencies,  and  the
farm price  is equal  to the retail price minus marketing charges.  The
farm price  of United  States cotton  (in the absense of price supports)
will be determined by the levels of demand and supply in the United
States  and  also  in  other  countries.  The impacts  of  changes  in  eco-
nomic  activity  are  transmitted  into  the  feed  grain  economy  via
disposable  income,  retail  prices  of  livestock  products,  changes  (if
any)  in marketing  charges  on livestock  products,  and  thence  to  the
farm  prices  of  livestock  products,  which  influence  the  demand  for
feed grains.  The other  main  factors  influencing  farm  prices  of  feed
grains  are  weather,  carry-over  stocks,  and  the  numbers  of  grain-
consuming  livestock  on  hand.  The  resulting  price  of  feed  grains
influences  the quantity of grains  fed to livestock  and the  number of
livestock  which  are  produded  or  carried  over  into  the  following
season.
Farm  price-support  programs  attempt  to  avert  the  "normal"
consequences  of  free  market  demand  and supply  structures  such  as
those  mentioned  above.  They act  to maintain  farm  prices  and  cash
farm  income  in  the  face  of  adverse  changes  in  either  supply  or
demand  conditions.
FARM  PRICE  AND  INCOME  SUPPORTS  AS  DEFENSES
AGAINST  DEPRESSION
As  the legislative  revisions made  in  1954 are only now  beginning
to affect  prices,  and as  we are  all more  familiar with the  90  percent
program,  let us start with  it.
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The six so-called  basic commodities, cotton,  wheat, corn,  tobacco,
rice,  and  peanuts,  were  required  to be  supported  by means  of  non-
recourse  loans  at  90  percent  of  parity  through  the  1954  crop  year.
Parity  prices for wheat,  corn, cotton,  and peanuts  were  based  on the
old  formula;  those  for  rice  and  tobacco,  and  for  nearly  all  "non-
basic"  commodities,  were  already  on  the  modernized  formula.  In
1953,  the  six  basic  commodities  accounted  for  25  percent  of  total
cash  receipts  from  farm  marketings.
Price  support  was  also  mandatory  for  the  "designated  nonbasic
commodities,"  which  included  dairy  products,  wool,  mohair,  tung
nuts, and honey.  In  1953, cash  receipts for this group of commodities
amounted  to  14  percent  of  the  total.
During  1953,  several  other  nonbasic  commodities  were  accorded
price  support.  Under the law,  the Secretary  of Agriculture  may elect
to support  nondesignated  nonbasic  commodities  at any  level  from
0  to  90  percent  of  parity.  The  nonbasic  commodities  (other than
"designated")  which  were  supported  in  1953  accounted  for  1.8
billion  dollars,  or  6  percent,  of  total  cash  farm  income.
Altogether,  commodities  which  received  direct price  support  in
1953  accounted  for  14  billion  dollars,  or  45  percent,  of  total  cash
receipts from farm marketings. The remaining commodities,  account-
ing  for  55  percent  of  cash  receipts  (17  billion  dollars),  were  not
directly  supported.
A  large  part  of  total  price-support  activity  has  been  directed
toward  storable  crops,  particularly  wheat,  cotton,  and  feed  grains.
Once  a  fixed  dollar-and-cents  price  support  has  been  announced,
the  volume  of  price-support  activity  on  the  forthcoming  crop  de-
pends  upon  variations  in  yields,  in  the  foreign  supply  and  demand
situation,  and in  domestic  demand,  and  upon various  minor  factors
which  are  not  readily  measurable.
Year-to-year  fluctuations  in  crop  yields,  due  mainly  to  weather,
often  overshadow  the  effects  of year-to-year  changes in  consumer  de-
mand.  Sudden  reductions  in  export  demand  have  also  contributed
substantially  to  stock  buildups at  times.  If  such  reductions,  or high
crop  yields,  happen  to  coincide  with  an  economic  recession,  the
importance  of  the  recession  itself  as  a  factor  in  the  accumulation
of  price-support  stocks  tends  to be  exaggerated.  Such  a  coincidence,
as  during  1948-50,  leads  in  turn  to  overestimation  of  the  contribu-
tion of the price-support program to offsetting the effects of recession.
While  Commodity  Credit  Corporation  inventories  and  loans  out-
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1950,  at least half of this was due to factors other than the  recession.
Operation of  the 90 Percent  Price-Support
Program During a Severe  Recession
We  shall  now  proceed  with  an  illustration  of  how  the  price-
support  program  just  described  might  operate  during  a  severe
economic  recession.  To simplify  the  illustration,  we  shall  make  sev-
eral assumptions:  (1)  average weather in each year of the recession-
hence,  average  crop  yields  except  for  possible  effects  of  the  price-
support  program  itself;  (2)  no sharp  changes  in the  production  of
crops  in  foreign  countries  or  in  the  level  of  demand  in  foreign
countries  except  as  this  may  reasonably  be  related  to  a  domestic
economic  recession;  and  (3)  continuation  of price-support  commit-
ments  for  the  same  commodities  and  at  the  same  percentages  of
parity  throughout  the  recession  as  at  the  time  of  its  assumed  be-
ginning.  The  recession  we  assume  to  be  about  as  severe  as  seems
within the  range  of possibility  in  view of  the  various  built-in  stabi-
lizers in the economy  today, and the greater readiness  of government
to engage  in remedial  action.
The over-all results of the projections based on these  assumptions
follow:  At the bottom  of the recession,  farm  prices are down  21  per-
cent  without  a  support  program  as  against  12  percent  with  price
supports.  Without  supports,  farm  cash receipts  are estimated  to  de-
cline  by  more  than  6  billion  dollars  annually;  with  supports,  the
decline  is estimated  at about  4  billion dollars-that  is,  cash  receipts
would be at least  2  billion dollars higher with supports than without
them.  With  production  expenditures  probably  not  much  different
under  the  two  programs,  the  net  incomes  of  farm  families  would
also be about 2 billion dollars higher  (or more precisely, would have
dropped  2  billion  dollars  less  from  prerecession  levels)  than  in the
absence  of  price  supports.  This  difference  would  represent  roughly
20  percent  of  net  farm  income.
In accomplishing  this degree  of income support,  the  Commodity
Credit Corporation would significantly  increase its  outlays for  price-
support  stocks.  At  the  recession  trough,  about  5  percent  of  the
current  volume  of  farm  marketings  would  be  going  into  price-
support  stocks,  despite  marketing  quotas  at  minimum  levels  for
the  basic  cash  crops.
Effects  of  the 90 Percent Program
Upon  the Course of  the Recession
Obviously,  a price-support  program affects  the time path of  farm
prices  and  incomes  during  a  recession.  But  what  a  farm  price-
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the  remainder  of  the economy  is  a  more  difficult  question.
I do  not claim to have a  satisfactory  answer  myself.  But I  believe
I  can  lay out  some  of  the  relevant  considerations,  and  perhaps  give
a  rough  idea  of  the  effect  of  the  farm  price-support  program  upon
various  economic  magnitudes.
PATHS  OF INTERACTION.  Tie farm price-support  program has three
direct  effects:  (1)  it  raises  the  average  level  of  prices  received  by
farmers;  (2)  it slightly  reduces  farm  output, and  (3)  it reduces  the
commercial  utilization  of  farm  products.
Suppose,  for  example,  that  the  direct  effect  of  a  price-support
program  is  to  increase  farm  prices  by  10  percent.  If  marketing
margins  remain  constant,  this  will  increase  retail  food  prices  about
4 percent,  using  1955  marketing margins.  As retail  food  prices  carry
a  weight  of 30  percent in  the consumer  price index,  that  index will
rise  1.2  percent.
The consumer  price  index plays  an important  role  in some  wage
contracts,  and  it  is  widely  used  as  a talking  point  in  wage  disputes.
Wage  rates  in  turn  influence  gross  national  product  and  the  retail
prices  of nonfood  products.
An  increase  in  the  consumer  price  index  thus  increases  wage
rates,  which increase  nonfood  prices,  which enter the consumer price
index  with  a  weight  of  70  percent.  Hence,  the  total  effect  upon
the  consumer  price  index  of  an  increase  in  farm  prices  consists  of
the direct influence  on food  prices plus this  more  roundabout  effect.
An  initial  increase  of  10  percent  in  prices  received  by  farmers
leads  directly,  through  prices  of purchased  livestock,  feed,  and  food
products,  to  something  like  a  1.5  percent  increase  in  the  index
of  prices  paid by  farmers.  A  much  smaller  indirect  effect  also  oper-
ates through  the consumer  price  index,  wage  rates,  and retail  prices
of non-food  products.  Under  the present  price-support  program,  the
direct  influence  of  a  1  percent  increase  in  the  prices  paid  index
would  apply  to  products  accounting  for  only  45  percent  of  cash
farm  income;  hence,  the direct  effect  on the average  level  of all farm
prices  would  be  only  0.45  percent.  In  addition,  price-support  levels
for  feed  grains  would  have  some  influence  upon  the  unsupported
prices  of  meat  animals,  poultry,  and  eggs.
The  chains  of influence  just  noted  tend  to raise  disposable  per-
sonal  income,  particularly  that  of  nonfarm  people.  An  increase  in
disposable  income  raises prices  of those  farm products  which  are not
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fixed;  it  also  increases  commercial  utilization  (but  not  prices)  of
farm products which are in surplus at their applicable support  prices.
The  net  increase  in  CCC  stocks  as  a  result  of  the  price-support
program represents an injection  of money from outside of the private
economy.  It  is  equivalent  to  a  purchase  of goods by  the federal  gov-
ernment,  with,  in  the  practical  situation,  no  simultaneous  increase
in  government  revenue.
If we  consider  these  various  effects  upon  the  nonfarm  economy,
it  appears  that  if  the  price  support  initially  or  directly  increased
farm  prices  by  10  percent,  the  final  level  of  farm  prices  would  be
about  12  percent  higher  than  it  would  have  been  in  the  absence
of  a price-support  program.
ESTIMATED  EFFECTS.  The estimated  decline  in  farm prices during
a  recession  similar  to that assumed  earlier in  this paper  thus is  only
half  as  large  as  that  experienced  in  the  absence  of  price  supports.
At  the  recession  trough,  farm  prices  with  the  support  program  are
estimated  to  be  13  percent higher than  farm  prices  without support.
The index  of prices  paid by  farmers  is  indicated  to  be  more  than  2
percent  higher  as a result of  the price-support  program.  This would
mean  a  roughly  similar  increase  in  production  expenditures  and  a
corresponding reduction  in the net income differences  resulting from
the  farm  prices  shown.  The  parity  ratio  would  decline  about  13
points  in  the  absence  of  price  support,  and  about  6  points  under
the  support  program.  With  price  support  the  parity  ratio  would
increase  slightly  in  the  third  recession  year,  reflecting  the  delayed
action of  feed  grain  supports  upon  livestock  production  and  prices.
The  consumer  price  index  would  be  2.5  or  3 percent  higher  with
the  price-support  program  than  without  it.
This  analysis  indicates  a  gross  national  product  at  the  recession
trough  about  6  million  dollars  higher  with  the  price-support  pro-
gram  than  with  no  supports.  While  this  is  a  substantial  sum,  it  is
only  8  percent  of  the  assumed  total  decline  in  GNP  from  peak  to
trough  in  the  absence  of  a  price-support  program.
Finally,  at  the trough, disposable  income is  projected  as 4 billion
dollars  higher  with  the  present  price-support  program  than  in  the
absence  of  price  supports.  This  is  a  little  more  than  10  percent  of
the  estimated  decline  in  the  absence  of  price  supports.  Of  the  4
billion dollar increase,  2 billion or so may accrue to nonfarm  people,
while  the other 2  billion  would accrue  to farm  operators.
Although  we  have  had  to  make  several  assumptions  which  can-
not be  tested,  I believe  that this  analysis  defines  reasonably  well the
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course  of  an  economic  recession.  Under  the  recession  pattern  as-
sumed  here  the  90  percent  program  might  reduce  the  drift  in  the
general  retail price  level  by  as  much  as  30  percent;  it might  reduce
the  decline  in  GNP  and  disposable  personal  income  by  something
like  10  percent;  and it would reduce  the drop in  farm prices  (which
it  is  specifically  set  up  to  do)  by  50  percent  as  compared  with  the
level  expected  in  the  absence  of  a  price-support  program.
EFFECTS  OF  ALTERNATIVE  FARM  PROGRAMS  UPON  THE
COURSE  OF  A  RECESSION
Flexible  Price Supports:  The Agricultural Act  of  1949
Contrary  to some  rather  widespread  opinions,  price  supports  for
most of the basic crops  under the Agricultural  Act of  1949 were  not
low nor,  in most cases,  were they  extremely  flexible.  Under the  1949
act,  tobacco  was  to  be  supported  at 90  percent  of parity  in  any year
in  which  marketing  quotas  were  proclaimed.  In  the  case  of cotton,
even  if  certain  special  legislation  not  part  of  the  1949  act  were
eliminated, the price-support  level would rarely  fall below 90 percent
of  parity,  and  then,  as  a  rule,  by  rather  small  amounts.  The  pro-
visions  for corn  were  more  nearly  in  accord  with  the  popular  con-
ception  of  flexible  price  supports.  However,  the  then-record  supply
of  corn  in  1953  would  have  required  support  at  not  less  than  82
or  83  percent  of  parity.  Only  in  the  case  of  wheat  was  there  much
likelihood  that  supports  would  fall  as  low  as  75  percent  of  parity.
The flexibility which  might be  provided by large  supplies result-
ing from  bumper  corn  yields  was  at  least  partially  thwarted  by  the
forward-pricing  provision  of the  act.  If a minimum  dollar-and-cents
support  price  for corn  were  announced  before  planting  time,  based
on  the assumption  of average  yields,  the support  price  for  that crop
could  not  subsequently  be  lowered  to  take  into  account  favorable
weather  and  high  yields.  Hence,  if we  assume  the  Agricultural  Act
of  1949  to be  in effect and functioning  well according  to its  internal
logic just before the onset  of a recession,  farm prices  would  fall  only
a  little  faster  and  little  further  than under  the  program  of  support
for  basic  commodities  at  90  percent  of  parity.
The effects of the Agricultural Act of  1949 would  be very similar
to those  of the  90  percent  program  except  that  the  differences  from
"no  program" would  be only about  four-fifths  as large.  For example,
at  the  recession  trough,  the  index  of  prices  received  by  farmers
would be estimated  at about  220  under the  1949 act, compared  with
94225  under  the  90  percent  program  and  199  in  the absence  of price
supports.  (The  price  index just prior to  the  recession  was  assumed
to  be  252  in  each  case.)
Other  differences  would  be  roughly similar.  At the  low  point of
tlie recession,  cash receipts  from  farm  marketings  might be approxi-
mately  0.5  billion  dollars  lower  under  the  1949  act  than under  the
90  percent  program,  assuming  that  both  programs had  been  in
operation prior to the beginning of the assumed recession and that
they  had  resulted in precisely the same average prerecession levels
of prices, marketings, and income.
Effects  on  the General  Economy  of  Shifting from the
90 Percent Program to an Alternative Program
Changes  under  the  1954  act  did  not  affect  the  levels  of  price
support  for basic  crops until  the summer  or fall of  1955.  The  Presi-
dent's  farm  program,  as  transmitted  to  Congress  in  January  1954,
would  have  resulted  in  price  supports  for  cotton,  wheat,  and  corn,
as  a  group  averaging  perhaps  7  or  8  percent  below  the  1954  level
as  of  1955  and  perhaps  10  percent  lower  than  the  1954  level  as  of
1956.  The  margin would probably  average  little or no  greater  than
this  in  1957  and  later  years.  Thus,  as  compared  with  an  extension
of  the  90  percent  program  for  basic  crops,  the  President's  farm
program  might  have  involved  drops  in  farm  income  on  the  order
of  250  million  dollars  in  1955  and  perhaps  another  250  million
dollars in  1956. The  1956 differential might have been approximately
maintained  in  the  year  or  two  immediately  following.  Compared
with  the effects  of a severe  economic  recession,  which  in the absence
of  farm  price  supports  could amount  to as  much  as  a  5  or  6  billion
dollar  decline  in  cash  farm  income,  the  magnitudes  involved  in  a
shift  from  the  90  percent  program  to the  President's  farm  program
would  have  been  quite  small.
It cannot be denied,  however,  that either the President's program
or  the  Agricultural  Act  of  1949  would  have  led  to  a  significantly
lower  level  of  cash  farm  income  from  wheat  than  under  the  90
percent program. The differential  effects on cash income from cotton
and from  feed grains and livestock  products  would  have  been  small
- perhaps  almost negligible.
As  compared  with  the  90  percent  program,  an  abrupt  shift  to
the  Agricultural  Act  of  1949  could  have  resulted  in additional  suc-
cessive  impacts  in  the  autumns  of  1955  and  1956  of  at most  half a
billion  dollars  each  year.  The  impacts  would  have  been  severe  in
the specialized  wheat  areas.  However,  the  consequences  for  the rest
95of the economy could  scarcely  have exceeded  a reduction  of a billion
dollars  or  thereabouts  at  the  GNP  or disposable  income  level.
The  coincidence  of  such  a  transition  with  the  onset  of  a  reces-
sion  might have  led some  "lay  economists"  to  argue  that  the  transi-
tion  caused  the  recession.  However,  the  analysis  presented  here
indicates  that  this is  a  much  greater effect  than  can  be attributed  to
a  change  in  the  farm  price-support  program.  Its  initial  effect  would
do  very  little  to  aggravate  a  recession  already  under  way  and  its
consequences,  except  for  producers  of  the  crops  directly  affected,
would  speedily be lost if forces  originating in the nonfarm  sectors of
the  economy  were  sufficient  to  carry  the  recession  to  any  consider-
able  depth.
CONCLUSIONS
The  primary objective  of farm  price  supports  is  to support  farm
prices  of  specified  commodities  and  the  incomes  which  producers
derive  from  them.  How  much  can  a  farm  price-support  program
contribute  to  general  economic  stability?  This  depends  initially
upon  the  economic  size  of  agriculture  relative  to  the  general  econ-
omy.  Agriculture  produces  7  percent  or  less  of  the  gross  national
product.  Unless  agriculture  has  some  very  special  characteristics
other than  size,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  agricultural  programs  can
carry more  than 7  percent or so  of the total burden of stabilizing  the
economy.
Farm  price  supports  operate  at  the  cash  receipts  level.  Cash
receipts  are  equal  in  size  to  8  or  9  percent  of  the  gross  national
product  and  are  conceptually  a  little  "grosser."
Direct  price  supports are  in effect  now  on  commodities  account-
ing  for  less  than  50  percent  of  cash  receipts,  although  the  direct
price  supports for  feed grains  also have  an indirect  price-supporting
effect  for  livestock  products.  Roughly  speaking,  these  two  sorts  of
influences  would be equivalent  to the effects  of direct  price  supports
on  4  or  5  percent  of  GNP.
Differences  in  the  alternative  farm  programs  now  under  dis-
cussion  involve  fractions  of  the  range  between  75  and  90  percent
of  parity  on  some  of  the  directly  supported  commodities.  In  other
words,  they involve  fractions of  1 percent  of GNP.  These differences
are important to producers of wheat and certain other farm products;
they are relatively unimportant  from the standpoint  of the  economy
as  a  whole.
I believe  most agricultural  economists would have credited  price-
support  programs with  larger  effects upon  the general economy  than
96I have suggested here. However,  I am definitely not arguing that price
support  programs  are  of  negligible  importance  as  "built-in  stabi-
lizers."  At the  Conference on Policies to Combat  Depression,  several
other  papers  paralleled  mine  in  this  respect:  They  concluded  that
the  particular  economic  area  they were  discussing was  equivalent  to
only  5  or  10 percent of GNP and that programs  directed  to that area
could not do  a very  large  share  of  the total  stabilization  job.  But if
the effects of programs in, say,  five such areas are additive, collectively
they  may  accomplish  a third  or a  half of  the  total job.  If there  are
important  interactions  or  secondary  effects,.  they  may  accomplish
still  more.
The  price-support  program  alone cannot avert recessions.  But as
one  member  of  a stabilization  team  it can  certainly  help.
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